There was a major escalation in Washington’s pressure campaign against the Venezuelan regime this week when the US military seized the sanctioned oil tanker Skipper off the coast of Venezuela on the very same day that the Nobel Peace Prize was being awarded to Maria Corina Machado—the Venezuelan opposition leader. The Trump administration has been focused on Latin America since day one, and it’s generating both regional and global responses: this week the Mexican government approved raising import taxes on Asian goods, further solidifying North American economic integration and frustrating Beijing in the process. Meanwhile, China’s looking to make deeper inroads in its own neighborhood, expanding trade with Southeast Asia. It’s a highly dynamic moment and as we approach 2026, everyone is looking at how to best ride the wave of global competition.
Kind Regards,
Jack Devine
CIA Spymaster & Chairman, TAG Intel
Emerging World (Dis)Order
Sanctions enforcement against Venezuela is nothing new, but what unfolded off Venezuela’s coast this week lands in a different category. The seizure of the Skipper—a supertanker with a long history of moving sanctioned crude—was a high-visibility operation that embodies Washington’s escalating efforts to isolate the Maduro regime.
The ship has connections to Venezuelan and Iranian crime networks and is assessed to have been bound for Cuba. Using helicopters, elite Coat Guard units, and marines may appear to be Washington’s latest show of military force, but removing over a million barrels of crude from circulation strikes at Maduro’s financial lifelines, as well as his partners—Teheran and Havana. That may be the main story here.
The Skipper isn’t unique—many similar vessels are already sanctioned—but the recent designation of the Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization gives the US more latitude than ever to seize tankers lifting Venezuelan oil and carry out more seizures.
I’ll be watching Washington’s next moves carefully, as interdicting China-bound tankers risks injecting friction into already delicate trade discussions, while going after Russia-linked shipments could muddy the diplomatic channels still in play over Ukraine. Then again, the threat of targeting Russia-bound crude could become valuable leverage if negotiations continue to drag. By contrast, Cuba-destined vessels, as the Skipper was, are relatively risk-free targets for draining Maduro’s revenue streams while telegraphing that commercial ties with Caracas now come with real exposure to asset seizure.
This operation also signals a pivot regarding how the US intends to wield its maritime muscle, and governments across the hemisphere are recalibrating in response. What matters now is whether the Skipper seizure becomes an isolated demonstration or the opening act of a sustained interdiction campaign. If Washington chooses the latter, the economic pressure on Maduro could intensify rapidly—and with it the geopolitical and economic consequences as states weigh the risks of moving Venezuelan crude under an American spotlight.
Middle East in Flux
One year after the stunning fall of Syria’s longstanding leading Assad family and the ascent of former jihadist Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s as the nation’s new interim President, the world is watching to see if Syria is going to be able to emerge from decades of darkness—both economic and political. Over the past twelve months the opportunities and challenges have been laid bare, and it’s clear that for Syria to succeed moving forward will require some leaps of faith by all interested parties. I personally hope they take them.
So far, Al-Sharaa has achieved a remarkable diplomatic transformation, evolving from a $10 million US bounty terrorist target to meeting President Trump in Riyadh within six months of taking power. By mid-2025, the US, UK, and UN had lifted FTO designations and sanctions and his September UN General Assembly address—the first by a Syrian leader in sixty years—cemented Al-Sharaa’s international rehabilitation. The EU and partners committed €5.8 billion for recovery in 2025-2026, the World Bank approved its first Syria project in four decades, and Gulf states have pledged billions in investment.
But Syria has sustained an estimated $800 billion in economic losses over the past decade of civil war and sanctions, with 90% of the population now living in poverty, electricity available only 2-4 hours daily, and projections showing 55 years needed to recover 2010 GDP levels at current growth rates. Reconstruction estimates range from $141-343 billion, yet humanitarian appeals remain less than 30% funded. Further complicating the picture, sectarian violence constantly threatens state cohesion and makes Syria a less certain investment at a time when it’s desperate for cash.
While Al-Sharaa has paid lip service to ensuring minority rights and democratic processes in Syria, government forces killed approximately 1,500 Alawite civilians in March 2025 and 1,000-2,000 Druze in July. Minorities remain excluded from security and intelligence leadership, while Kurdish forces demand constitutional recognition and Druze leaders—supported by an aggressive Israel which creates its own political challenges—call for independence. Alawite representatives also warn of existential threats.
The interim constitution further establishes Islam as “the main source of legislation” and restricts the presidency to Muslims. Reports document systematic discrimination against Christians, restrictive social codes, and policies aimed at creating a “homogenized Sunni Islamist state”. The October 2025 parliamentary elections were a tightly controlled affair, with political parties banned and minimal participation—hardly democratic legitimation.
While Al-Sharaa has secured unprecedented international legitimacy and substantial financial commitments that are impressive given the circumstances, sustainable statehood requires more than diplomatic recognition—it demands economic viability, security provision, and inclusive governance. But even if Syria’s falling short of this kind of transformational change at present, avoiding complete state collapse or Libya-style fragmentation still represents a relative success and I hope we’ll take every leap we can to make it a complete one.
Resource Security, Tech, and Competition
China has entered new territory with its trade surplus crossing the $1 trillion mark for the first time, powered by a surge in overseas shipments that span everything from clothing to electric vehicles, batteries, and solar panels. While exports to the United States have decreased during President Trump’s second term, Beijing has compensated by deepening its footprint in Southeast Asia and Europe, and by moving some manufacturing abroad to preserve low-tariff access.
Weak domestic demand and a prolonged property slowdown have pushed Beijing to lean heavily on exports to sustain economic activity. A cheaper renminbi has only reinforced that momentum, making Chinese products more competitive abroad while discouraging imports at home.
It’s an economic dynamic to keep an eye on because China’s trade position feeds into its geopolitical reach, supporting outward investment and strengthening its position in sectors ranging from semiconductors to rare-earth metals.
The surplus shift is prompting unease in Europe. During his recent visit to Beijing, President Macron warned that the EU may resort to tougher trade measures if imbalances persist. Brussels has already signaled an ambition to reduce dependence on Chinese inputs—from rare earths to critical technologies. At the same time, Chinese officials have urged trade partners to resist what they describe as rising protectionism, arguing that tariff escalations risk harming all sides.
Meanwhile, Southeast Asia has become one of China’s most important outlets for redirected trade. Exports to the region are growing far faster than in previous years, embedding Chinese firms deeply into regional supply chains. The area’s strategic location—and its role as a manufacturing hub—has only amplified this trend. Chinese investment is rising across infrastructure, telecommunications, and industrial production, even as several Southeast Asian economies continue to diversify and maintain strong links with Western partners.
Right now, across the global economy, it’s looking like tariffs have redirected Chinese trade rather than reduced it. Allies are struggling to navigate between economic exposure and strategic caution. And China is anchoring a new commercial geography centered on Asia, while keeping European markets within reach.
Our team performs due diligence and assesses the risk profiles of Chinese and ASEAN partners, screening for political exposure, cybersecuirty concerns, and regulatory red flags. Explore our services.
Weekly Wildcard
And in a move that reflects this ongoing, global trade fragmentation, Mexico is jumping into the tariff game—to the displeasure of major Asian economic players. On Wednesday, Mexico’s Senate approved legislation imposing duties between 5% and 50% on over 1,400 products from Asian nations lacking trade agreements with Mexico, signaling a fundamental realignment in North American economic strategy. The move primarily targets China but it also significantly impacts India and other Asian economies while simultaneously strengthening Mexico’s relationship with the United States.
The tariff regime serves multiple geopolitical objectives. It’s a defensive maneuver ahead of the 2026 USMCA review, designed to preempt US President Trump’s repeated tariff threats against Mexico, while also aligning with Washington’s broader strategy to contain Chinese economic influence in the Western Hemisphere. And it aims to protect Mexican domestic manufacturing as nearshoring accelerates, ensuring Mexico captures value-added production rather than serving merely as a transshipment hub for Asian goods.
China faces the most severe consequences. With ~$130 billion in annual exports to Mexico now subject to steep duties, it will hit the Chinese automotive sector especially hard. Mexico became China’s largest export market for automobiles in the first half of 2025, and the tariffs effectively close what had become a critical backdoor into the North American market–forcing Chinese manufacturers to either establish production facilities within USMCA countries or abandon the region. Mexico’s action can be seen as a strategic victory for US containment policy, achieved without direct bilateral confrontation between Washington and Beijing.
But India faces collateral damage in a trade war not of its making. With approximately three-quarters of India’s ~$5.7 billion in annual exports to Mexico now affected, the automotive sector bears the brunt. This comes at a particularly vulnerable moment, as India already faces 50% US tariffs. The timing undermines Prime Minister Modi’s strategy to position India as an alternative manufacturing hub to China, revealing the fragility of export-dependent growth strategies in an increasingly protectionist global environment.
Mexico’s tariffs strengthen USMCA preferences, making North American supply chains more competitive against Asian alternatives. However, there are risks here too, as higher input costs for US manufacturers sourcing from Mexico could accelerate inflation, and the precedent of aggressive tariff escalation may encourage similar moves by other trade partners. Over the coming months, I’ll be watching to see how China and India respond to the tariffs and how Washington will take this all into consideration as the next USMCA joint review approaches.
